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Non-Market Strategies, Corporate Political Activity and Organizational 
Social Capital: The US Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Process 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate political activity (CPA) can be an important element in any firm’s 
effort to gain competitive advantage.  This has been particularly true in the 
area of international trade, where domestic producers seek to bar or 
disadvantage foreign competitors in the home market though the imposition of 
trade protection.  In the United States the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
(AD) or countervailing duties (CVD) is among the most popular policy demand 
made by firms, and as such is a focus of corporate political activity.  This 
paper seeks to understand how and why some firms make more effective use 
of this process.  It does so by drawing on social capital (SC) theory to 
illuminate the qualitative aspects of effective corporate political activity. 
Resilient trust between firms and their attorneys is revealed as a prominent 
aspect of effective CPA. The paper also adds to the literature by including 
foreign as well as US firms in the sample. 
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Non-Market Strategies, Corporate Political Activity and Organizational 
Social Capital: The US Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Process 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-market strategies are receiving increasing interest amongst strategic 
management scholars as a mean of improving firm performance.  In chairing 
the 2007 Annual International Conference of the Strategic Management 
Society, Ring (2007) comments that:  
“Non-market strategies can be employed to create and/or maintain a firm’s 
source(s) of competitive advantage or to erode or destroy the sources of 
competitive advantages of its competitors” (1).  
In pursuing non-market strategies, firms may engage –directly or indirectly – 
in activity with one or more of a number of institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), domestic and international courts, legislative and 
regulatory bodies, as well as the media.  Of the literatures that speak to non-
market strategies, corporate political activity (CPA) is one such area in which 
firms overtly attempt to influence the political process, both at the domestic 
and international level, to achieve policy-based advantages.  To date, the 
CPA literature has focused to a great extent on firms’ use of material 
resources or ‘structural attributes’, such as money, firm size and the 
membership of business associations, to achieve policy goals.  Nonetheless, 
there has been no consensus on what characteristics describe effective CPA.  
This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of firms’ CPA, using the US 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) process as an investigatory 
lens.   
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are trade remedy measures 
governed by WTO agreements to prevent material injury to signatories’ 
domestic industries caused by unfair trade practices.  Anti-dumping cases 
address the actions of foreign firms whilst countervailing duty cases seek to 
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remedy the actions of foreign governments, which result in goods being sold 
at dumped prices (low or below cost) in the US market. The international trade 
policy process and US AD/CVD process, in particular, was selected because 
of the significant amount of CPA that takes place, especially in the US.  Here, 
the US Department of Commerce (DOC) and International Trade Commission 
(ITC) are the institutions charged with formally investigating claims.  During 
this process, the effectiveness of firms’ CPA is of central concern because the 
losses and gains associated with trade liberalization are concentrated on 
individual firms, despite the benefits of freer trade being diffuse across the 
economy.  To this end, firms have an incentive to lobby the DOC and ITC to 
successfully pursue trade remedy claims, which can be worth millions of 
dollars.  In 2004, for example, 34 cases worth $4.9 billion were filed (USITC, 
2005: 8).   
In examining CPA within the US AD/CVD process as a non-market 
strategy, this paper aims to make some theoretical and practical additions to 
the extant literature, as well as identifying a number of key lacunas.  Indeed, 
by focusing on structural attributes the CPA literature has ignored the 
important qualitative aspects of effective CPA.  Here, we define effective CPA 
as contingent upon the practitioner’s or respondent’s desired outcome.  
Ideally, the outcome for a responding firm is for no duty to be imposed.  
Alternately, where a duty is imposed, the most favourable outcome for a 
foreign producer is to have the DOC calculate a duty margin that still makes it 
worth exporting to the US and is significantly lower than the duty margins 
calculated for the other foreign producers of the subject goods.  Nonetheless, 
an agreeable outcome does not necessarily mean the winning of a case, but 
could be a reduction in remedial measures or even a media victory by 
heightening the public visibility of a domestic industry’s plight.   
In this vein, our core theoretical contribution rests in applying social 
capital (SC) theory to CPA to show the contribution that ‘relationships’ have 
on effective CPA.  Social capital, which refers to “the ability of actors to secure 
benefits by virtue of membership in social networks” (Portes, 1998: 6), helps 
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to explain how human capital is leveraged (Coleman, 1988), defined here as 
the knowledge, skills and experience of individuals (Swart et al., 2006).  It is 
important because where deployed effectively, social capital has clear rent 
generating and appropriation effects (Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998).  
This paper highlights the criticality of individual relationships between 
petitioners, respondents and their attorneys on effective CPA.  In so doing, we 
adopt the individual level definition of social capital, which highlights the 
contribution of SC to rent generation and appropriation more effectively than 
aggregate definitions (Portes, 1998; Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Blyler and 
Coff, 2003).  To determine the relationship between and impact of SC on 
effective CPA, we distinguish between different dimensions and configurations 
of SC. 
First, we pay attention to the different dimensions of SC.  In line with 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and later studies (Swart et al., 2006), we focus 
its structural (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Burt, 1992, 
1997; Fukuyama, 1995), relational (Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Van Deth, 
2003) and cognitive (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) dimensions.  Next, we 
position our study within the SC literature according to its three key variations: 
levels of analysis, its normative implications and the primacy of benefits 
(Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  Finally, by examining the relationships that 
exist between petitioners, respondents and trade attorneys within the US 
AD/CVD process, using Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s dimensions of SC, we 
suggest how different configurations of SC lead to potentially effective and 
ineffective CPA. 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
Despite the criticality of SC to effective CPA, the role of SC in the CPA 
literature remains understudied.  Here, we argue that the dimensions of SC – 
structural, relational and cognitive – generate SC configurations that help to 
explain the effectiveness of firms’ CPA.  In structuring our argument, we first 
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discuss the CPA literature and its key lacuna, the study of relationships.  
Before introducing SC theory, we present the US AD/CVD process within 
which we test our propositions, detailed later.  Due to the broadness of SC 
theory, we start by defining SC and state where our paper is situated within 
the literature.  This enables us to discuss the three dimensions of SC that we 
use as an organizing framework to examine how different SC configuration 
might influence effective CPA.   
What Is Corporate Political Activity? 
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) refers to the involvement firms in the political 
process, with the aim of securing particular policy preferences.  CPA has been 
the subject of considerable academic interest, particularly by American-based 
scholars. Vogel notes that the place of business in the political process – and 
the attendant scholarly interest – has changed dramatically in the postwar 
period.  Though scholars disagree over the precise extent of corporate 
influence over the policy process, Vogel notes that in the United States overt 
political activity by firms was essentially unheard of until the 1970s 
(1996:148).  This changed when amended campaign financing legislation 
paved the way for the creation of Political Action Committees (PACs).  PACs 
were a way that politicians seeking re-election could raise money in excess of 
limits on party-specific expenditures.  Parties may suffer under federally-
mandated funding rules, but PACs were private expressions of policy 
preferences and were not so constrained.  The 1980s saw dramatically 
increased CPA by firms, including new activity at the international level.  For 
example, American and European firms were key players in the development 
of international regulations for intellectual property at the WTO (Sell 2003).  
Lobbying scandals in the United States, most notably the arrest of Jack 
Abramoff in 2006, have also raised the profile of corporate involvement in the 
policy process among the wider public.  As the US economy becomes more 
integrated into the world economy, CPA extends further: foreign firms seeking 
to influence US public policy.  Indeed, restrictions on political activity by 
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foreign MNEs were relaxed during the Clinton Administration and several 
foreign firms have taken advantage of this opportunity.   
Though the practice of CPA has been subject to study, there is no 
consensus on what characteristics describe effective CPA.  Much of the CPA 
literature concentrates on what might be called ‘structural attributes’ of firms 
involved in the policy process.  Structural attributes concern the material 
resources that a firm can bring to the process – particularly money - as well as 
background conditions such as firm size and membership of business 
associations.  The emphasis on easily observable phenomena such as 
contributions to political action committees (PACs) does aid our understanding 
of how firms involve themselves in the process, but also has significant 
weaknesses.  Generally, the CPA literature makes what is observable 
important, rather than seeking ways to make what is important observable.  
Firms file contributions with Federal agencies, and their annual reports 
provide data on firm size and can be used to infer which public policy issues 
engage top management.  These are all important, but it is perhaps more 
salient that they are easily obtainable sources of data.   
Broadly, the literature can be understood to be engaged with three 
topics: the tactics used by firms in pursuit of policy ends; the effect that 
industry structure has on the tendency to lobby; and the attractiveness of the 
market for CPA.  In terms of tactics, Brasher and Lowery (2006) articulate the 
specific flaws that follow from a reliance on structural factors for explaining 
lobbying activity.  ‘Following the money’ by examining when and how firms 
seek to influence the political process is a common way to explore CPA.  
However, it leads scholars to focus too narrowly on one form of CPA, support 
for political campaigns, and in so doing ignores the diverse nature of 
corporate activity in support of commercial preferences.  De Figueiredo notes 
that while, ‘the vast majority of papers written about interest groups’ political 
influence focuses on the role of money in politics’ that actual amount of money 
spent on PACs is small (2002: 1).  While the US Congress controls a budget 
of over $2 trillion, the amount spent by firms in support of PACs in the 1999-
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2000 election cycle was a relatively paltry $200 million (ibid).  The British 
defence contractor, BAE Systems, gave some $650,000 to various 
congressional campaigns in 2005, though its US-based subsidiaries have 
over $40 billion worth of DoD contracts (Kirchgaessnerin, 2006).   Though one 
explanation may be that US politicians are easily swayed by donors, a deeper 
and ultimately more compelling explanation is that firms have other 
mechanisms for presenting their policy preferences. It also reflects the fact 
that in a complex polity like the United States, legislators seeking re-election 
are only part of the government apparatus.  Regulatory agencies, whose 
members are not usually directly elected, are key players in many developed 
states.  Lobbying regulators cannot be easily done through the electoral 
process, so other means and other instruments must be employed. 
The over-emphasis on PACs as a way to understand CPA has led 
other work to explore how firms combine tactics.  Schuler, Rehbein and 
Kramer (2002) develop an approach that tries to understand why firms might 
use multiple tactics in pursuit of policy goals.  Drawing on a wide literature and 
empirical work, they look to combine several perspectives to develop a better 
understanding of corporate political behaviour.  They focus renewed attention 
to the important role that information plays in the process.  Firms achieve 
access by having information that legislators and regulators need to develop 
and enact policies.  Moreover, the means by which this information passes 
can be important.  The firm-legislator relationship, rather like buyer-supplier, 
can be enhanced over time through reputational effects and trust (Schuler, 
Rehbein and Kramer, 2002: 661).  
In terms of industry structure, other work looks at the structural characteristics 
of industries to understand the nature and effectiveness of CPA. The more 
dependent an industry is on government contracts or regulatory frameworks, 
the more firms in the sector have an incentive to lobby.    In respect of industry 
structure, Mancur Olson’s work on interest group dynamics was employed to 
understand how firms act collectively to influence the political process.  As a 
result, it has long been suggested that the more concentrated the industry, the 
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more likely it is to organize effectively for political action.  This is because the 
relatively fewer number of producers in a concentrated sector makes 
developing a common position easier.  It is also easier to enforce agreements 
among a small set of players, so not only can concentrated industries develop 
political preferences, they can more easily enforce compliance among 
members than other sectors and so avoid free-riding.  This logic of collective 
action is seen, for example, in the European chemicals industry, where a 
small set of firms has a long history of successfully gaining trade protection for 
its members (Lawton and McGuire, 2005).  Hart (2003), however, draws 
attention to deficiencies in the Olsonian hypothesis.  He observes that in some 
concentrated sectors, cartel-like behaviour did not arise because smaller firms 
in the sector lobbied against the large firms.  Some dominant firms, like Intel, 
lobbied for public policies that had a benefit well beyond their corporate 
interest, contrary to the expectations of the Olsonian model (Hart, 2003: 282).  
In this latter case, however, it can be difficult to gauge how genuine apparent 
corporate altruism really is, since any large firm will gain considerably from a 
positive policy outcome and so may tolerate free-riding by smaller firms 
(Schuler, 1996). 
In terms of the political market, supply-side considerations are also 
important to understanding CPA.  Bonardi, Hillman and Keim (2005) 
conceptualised the policy-making process as a marketplace, where it might be 
expected that firms would increase their lobbying when they regarded the 
political market as particularly attractive.  In other words, firms are sensitive to 
the opportunities presented during a policy debate and are more inclined to 
enter the process only when they rate highly their chances of success.  
Tripathi’s (2000) work on PAC activity among US defence contractors is 
suggestive of this.  He argues that what best explains lobbying activity among 
these firms is not firm size, nor even simple dependence on contracts.  
Rather, firms of all sizes and competitive positions increase their PAC 
contributions when the defence budget increases.  They reduce – and target – 
their corporate political activities when the budget contracts or its growth 
slows.  In short, the ‘size of the pie’ is itself a sufficient motivation for CPA 
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(Tripathi, 2000:54).  Legislative requirements or political conditions may also 
make for a more attractive political market.  In the area of trade policy, the US 
requires a formal consultative process between government officials and 
firms.  This has dramatically increased the scope for CPA in this area.  
Though the US is unusual in the degree of institutionalisation, many other 
governments have adopted similar consultative mechanisms.  The EU, for 
example, actively seeks firm input into the prosecution of trade disputes at the 
WTO – rather than waiting for firms to lobby for protection – leading one 
scholar to describe the relationship as a ‘public-private partnership’ (Shaffer, 
2003). 
Ultimately, CPA seeks to confer some form of policy-based advantages 
for firms.  With this in mind, the central question must be: How do firms 
effectively engage in CPA?  Though much of the CPA work is sophisticated in 
its understanding of structure and tactics, it is not always clear that the 
research gains insight into whether a given corporate effort is effective, or why 
one firm might succeed where another fails.  Qualitative aspects of the CPA 
phenomena exist do exist. Hillman, Zardkoohi and Bierman (1999) consider 
the particular advantages that might accrue to firms employing former 
government employees.  These people can lend legitimacy to lobbying 
requests through their personal reputation with officials, as well as providing 
specialist knowledge. Brook’s (2005) analysis of the steel industry adopts a 
descriptive case study approach whilst Schuler, Rehbein and Kramer (2002) 
consider how relationships and trust might affect outcomes. However, taken 
as a whole, the CPA literature seems to describe a process where the key 
drivers are structural, and there is little scope for qualitative aspects of 
relationships.  Yet surely few other realms of business activity are more about 
human relations than CPA.  Understanding the qualitative nature of the 
process is thus imperative.  This softer side of CPA has been understudied 
because of the lack of robust methods for collecting and analysing data.  This 
paper offers an approach that addresses these defects by drawing on the SC 
literature, and in so doing allows us insight into an understudied but important 
aspect of business-government relations. 
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The US Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Process 
The ITC defines dumping as having taken place when “a foreign producer 
sells a product in the United States at a price that is below that producer's 
sales price in its home market, or at a price that is lower than its cost of 
production” (USITC, 2005). “Subsidizing occurs when a foreign government 
provides financial assistance to benefit the production, manufacture, or 
exportation of a good” (USITC, 2005).  The US AD and CVD institutions have 
received significant attention in the academic literature (Finger, Hall, and 
Nelson, 1982, Mah, 2000, Moore, 1992).  A key question that has been posed 
in this literature is the degree to which political influence or statutory criteria 
determine the outcomes of cases (Anderson, 1993, DeVault, 2002, Moore, 
1992). Indeed, political influence is exercised on behalf of the petitioning 
industry and these studies seek to identify measures of industry political 
influence and regress them against case outcomes. Hansen and Prusa 
(1997), for example, argue that the ITC is vulnerable to political pressure, but 
that traditional measures of industry political power such as industry size and 
concentration are not good predictors of case outcomes. Instead 
Congressional “oversight representation and campaign contributions are the 
more relevant determinants of political influence” (Hansen and Prusa, 1997: 
243). In a step towards looking inside the firm for answers to successful 
prosecutions of US AD cases, Blonigen (2006) asks what influence 
experience has on the success rate of petitioners. Prior experience is found to 
be linked to increased filings and more successful cases, but also with a fall in 
average duty margins secured (Blonigen, 2006). This work suggests that 
experience of the process of prosecuting AD cases may lower filing costs and 
so encourage firms to file weaker petitions. However, the possibility that 
relationships between participants in AD and CVD cases may be able to 
influence the effectiveness of companies in petitioning and responding 
industries remains unstudied. 
In setting out the AD/CVD process, both AD and CVD cases progress 
through three broad phases: (1) pre-petitioning, (2) investigation and (3) 
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review.  To date the majority of studies have focused on the original 
investigation phase of a case at the DOC and ITC. However, the findings of 
Lindeque (2007 - forthcoming) show that if one is to fully understand the 
experience of petitioning and responding companies in the prosecution of AD 
and CVD cases in the US, then it is important to also consider the pre-
petitioning and review stages of a case. There are also three perspectives of 
the prosecution of these cases in the US, an agency perspective, the 
petitioning industry’s perspective and the respondents’ perspective.  The 
process of prosecuting an AD or CVD case in the US is represented in Figure 
1.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
During each of the three phases an antidumping or countervailing duty case 
goes through, the two agencies, petitioners and respondents will be called 
upon to undertake a variety of tasks and the demands placed on each of 
these interests will vary during the course of an investigation. Petitioning and 
responding companies will draw on different relationships to meet the 
changing requirements of the administrative process. Blonigen’s (2006) 
finding that experience affects the effectiveness of industries’ prosecution of 
AD cases is echoed in the findings of this paper.  Interviewees clearly 
identified experience as having an impact on the ability of participants to 
prosecute a US trade remedy case (interview 16, interview 41, interview 46).  
During the pre-petition phase the agencies and respondents will 
typically not be very active. The petitioning industry is very active during this 
phase as it builds its case. The demands placed on the interests during the 
original investigation of a case also vary. A case will move between the DOC 
and ITC and this also determines the demands on the petitioners and 
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respondents. While the case is at the DOC the responding firms will be very 
busy, as the DOC is charged with identifying dumping or subsidisation and 
this requires responding firms and governments to provide very large amounts 
of data to the DOC and requires a significant resource commitment from 
respondents to take part. At the ITC the process focuses on the petitioning 
industry and the burden of providing information falls on the petitioning firms, 
US importers and respondents. This change in focus of the investigation 
between the agencies provides the opportunity for firms to make strategic 
choices about resource allocation when prosecuting a case.  
Studies of antidumping and countervailing duty cases in the US 
typically focus on the formal investigation that takes place at the DOC and 
ITC. While there are some differences in the specifics of how each of these 
two types of trade remedy is investigated, the process is largely identical. 
Primary differences are for example the different statutory timetable for each 
of the cases and the type of activity which has to be proved to have taken 
place by the DOC. The two types of case however follow the same 
investigatory stages. A case is initiated by a domestic US industry filing a 
petition alleging dumping by or subsidisation of a foreign industry or a case 
can be self initiated by the DOC. The DOC makes an initial determination of 
whether there is enough information in the petition to substantiate the claims 
in the petition and the ITC then makes a preliminary determination of injury to 
the domestic US industry. If either of these two determinations are negative, 
then the case is terminated. Next the DOC makes a preliminary determination 
of dumping or subsidization, This is the only stage in the investigation where a 
negative determination does not terminate the case. Commerce then makes a 
final determination and if it is affirmative, the case continues to the ITC. If the 
final ITC determination of material injury to the US industry is affirmative, the 
DOC issues instructions for duties to be put in place on the subject 
merchandise. An investigation can last between 280 and 420 days depending 
on its complexity.  
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The review stage of an antidumping and countervailing duty case 
provides an opportunity for respondents and petitioners to get the duty margin 
imposed in the original investigation reassessed and requires firms in both 
industries to prepare for potential annual reviews of the duty margin, through 
administrative reviews. A number of other types of reviews also take place 
during this phase allowing firms not party to the original investigation to get a 
duty rate established for them, or for scope reviews of products, determining 
whether a specific good should be subject to an antidumping or countervailing 
duty margin, for example.  
What Is Social Capital? 
We define SC as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 243).  
Referring to “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in 
social networks” (Portes, 1998: 6), it has received much interested in the 
management literature due to its role in generating (Leana and Van Buren, 
1999; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and appropriating (Blyler and Coff, 2003) 
rents.  However, as Leana and Van Buren (1999) suggest, SC has many 
faces.  Therefore, in accurately applying SC theory to a phenomenon or new 
area of the literature, it is paramount to take into consideration differences in 
its treatment.  Such variation includes (1) levels of analysis, (2) its normative 
implications and (3) the primacy of benefits (Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  
These conceptual differences within SC theory are discussed in order to 
indicate where our paper is situated within the SC literature, as well as provide 
an organizing framework to apply SC theory to effective CPA. 
Multiple levels of analysis have been employed to describe SC, viewed 
as an attribute of individuals (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Belliveau, 
O’Reilly and Wage, 1996), individual networks (Burt, 1992), intra-firm 
interactions (Baker, 1990), communities (Putnam, 1993) and nations or 
geographical regions (Fukuyama, 1995), reflecting a micro to macro 
investigatory lens (Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  This paper, in assessing the 
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relationships between petitioners, respondents and their attorneys within the 
ADVCD process, adopts a more micro lens of analysis, focusing on individual 
relationships.  
In terms of the normative implications of SC, the debate has focused 
on the ‘weak tie’ (Granovetter, 1973, 1985) / ‘brokerage’ or ‘structural holes’ 
(Burt, 1992, 1997) versus ‘strong tie’ (Fukuyama, 1995) / ‘closure’ (Coleman, 
1988, 1990) perspectives of social network theory.  These schools of thought 
reflect the frequency of interaction and morphology of relationships (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998).  Despite some recent synthesis in the literature (Burt, 
2005), conflict between the relative benefits of these perspectives remains.  
The brokerage school promotes the opportunities afforded by weak ties / 
network heterogeneity that enable individuals to engage in strategically 
positioned brokerage and boundary spanning activities across social units 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Burt, 1992).  Alternately, the closure school 
highlights the value in strong ties / network homogeneity resulting in more 
frequent, bounded and cohesive interactions between individuals within social 
units (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995).  In this paper, the nature of 
relationships between individual trade attorneys and petitioners and 
respondents within the ADVCD process varies considerably, such that both 
the brokerage and closure perspectives are relevant units of analysis. 
Finally, the primacy of benefits refers to the ‘private’ (Lin et al., 1981; 
Belliveau et al., 1996; Burt, 1997) and ‘public’ (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 
1995) models of SC.  These perspectives indicate (1) where benefits accrue 
from social relationships, whether at the individual (private) or group / societal 
(public) level and (2) the focus of value appropriation, whether the primary 
payoff rests with the individual first and social unit thereafter (private) or social 
unit first, with the individual receiving indirect benefit (public).  In the AD/CVD 
process, our analysis suggests that the focus of value generation and 
appropriation is at the firm level, derived from the actions of petitioners and 
respondents, with individual attorneys (networks of attorneys) attaining 
secondary benefits. 
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Dimensions of Social Capital 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) three dimensions of SC – structural, relational 
and cognitive – form our unit of analysis.  The structural aspect has already 
been discussed in the previous section; in other words, the normative 
implication of SC.  As a unit of analysis, we examine what types of structural 
relationships are present at each stage in the AD/CVD process, whether there 
are frequent or infrequent interactions and strong or weak ties between actors 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Marsden and Campbell, 1984; Coleman, 1988, 
1990; Burt, 1992, 1997, 2005; Fukuyama, 1995; Walker et al., 1997; Leana 
and Van Buren, 1999; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001).  Information is a key 
resource and both strong and weak ties provide individuals with greater 
access to this resource (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  However, where 
relationships exhibit weak ties or structural holes, this enables information to 
be shared more efficiently (Burt, 1992). 
The relational nature of SC reflects the interaction of actors over time 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and can be characterized in terms of the trust 
that is embedded in relationships.  Leana and Van Buren (1999) frame trust 
along two dimensions: ‘fragile’ (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Ring, 1996) 
versus ‘resilient’ (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) and ‘dyadic’ (Granovetter, 
1985; versus ‘generalized’ (Putnam, 1993).  “Fragile trust is believed to need 
reciprocal exchanges (give and take) for the relationship to last whereas 
resilient trust is developed over time and is guided more by norms of 
behaviour in the social unit than an actualization of equal exchanges (Swart et 
al., 2006: 5).  Resilient trust reduces transaction costs, in particular, the 
likelihood for monitoring and risk of opportunism (Putnam, 1993).  Trusting 
relationships also encourage individuals to engage in cooperative activity, 
potentially creating a virtuous cycle of trusting behaviour (Putnam, 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Tyler and Kramer, 1996).  Another valuable aspect of 
trusting relationships is the ability to facilitate the sharing of highly sensitive 
information unavailable to individuals who do not commands such high levels 
of trust (Leana and Pil, 2006).  Such sharing leads to resource combination 
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(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  “Dyadic trust requires knowledge of and 
contact with another actor whilst generalized trust pertains to the social unit as 
a whole rather than specific actors” (Swart et al., 2006: 5).   
The cognitive dimension of SC refers to those “those resources 
providing shared representation, interpretations, and systems of meaning 
among parties” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 244).  On this basis, we 
examine to what extent the relationship between actors exhibits shared 
language, codes (Cicourel, 1973; Arrow, 1974) and narratives (Orr, 1990).  
The sharing of language and codes has a number of benefits: (1) it provides a 
conduit for information exchange and helps an individual to gain access to 
people and their information; (2) it provides a framework of reference that 
individuals use to understand their shared environment; and (3) it enhances 
collaborative capability.  Shared narratives – myths, stories and metaphors – 
support knowledge creation and transfer by enabling the communication of 
imaginative and literal observations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
----------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Whilst this study uses Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) three dimensions of SC 
as our unit of analysis, we also share the authors’ view that such an analytical 
separation does not mean that these dimensions are not highly related.  
Where relationships exhibit strong ties, they improve levels of trust and 
trustworthiness.  Furthermore, more frequent interaction between individuals 
enables them to develop a shared language, codes and narratives, which also 
facilitates more trusting relations (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE ANTI-
DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY PROCESS 
Methodology 
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The data used in this study were collected between November 2005 and July 
2006 using forty-five semi-structured interviews. A total of thirty-two of the 
interviews were personal interviews, sixteen were telephone interviews. 
Twenty of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and then fully 
transcribed for analysis the remaining interviews were recorded using hand 
written notes, which were recorded in electronic form as soon as possible 
after an interview was conducted to ensure as accurate an account of the 
interview as possible. Interviews were conducted with thirty-eight trade 
attorneys and four economic consultants in Washington, DC, who had 
represented either petitioning and / or responding firms in industries subject to 
either antidumping and / or countervailing duty cases. A further two interviews 
were also conducted with business practitioners who had participated in an 
antidumping case and one with a member of staff at one of the research 
institutes in Washington, DC. Seven of the participants described themselves 
as having exclusively petitioner experience, thirteen had only respondent 
experience and a further eight had worked with both petitioners and 
respondents. With respect to agency experience, six of the participants had 
worked at the DOC and six had spent time at the ITC. Ten of the interviewees 
had mostly or only experience of AD cases, only one respondent had only 
CVD experience and seventeen respondents said they had experience of both 
AD and CVD cases. 
The semi-structured interviews were used to discuss the process of 
prosecuting an antidumping or countervailing duty case, the decisions firms 
must make, the strategic intent of firms and the challenges faced by firms 
participating in trade remedy cases. NVivo, a programme that allows a 
researcher to code text and then retrieve that text (Bryman, 2004) was used to 
code the interview transcripts. NVivo does not interpret data, it merely takes 
over many of the mechanical activities associated with the coding process 
(Bryman, 2004). For this paper NVivo was used to identify relationships 
between different organizations in the process of prosecuting trade remedy 
cases in the US. 
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In analysing effective CPA within the AD/CVD process, we examine the 
structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of the relationships between 
actors involved in the process, focusing on petitioners, respondents and 
attorneys.  We describe these relationships through each stage in the 
AD/CVD process: the pre-petitioning, introduction and review phase.  For 
each stage, we describe its purpose and context within the AD/CVD process, 
set out the actors involved during the phase and their roles, discuss the nature 
of the relationships using Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s dimensions and suggest 
potential SC configurations that could lead to effective and ineffective CPA.  In 
so doing, we draw on interviews conducted with individuals involved in the 
AD/CVD process, including petitioners, respondents, attorneys and 
economists. 
Pre-Petitioning Phase 
The main actors during the pre-petitioning phase are petitioners, their clients, 
respondents and attorneys.  For petitioners the phase is primarily concerned 
with two main activities, identifying the possibility of a trade remedy case and 
preparing the petition. The key relationships that petitioners draw on to identify 
the need for an AD/CVD case include those with their US purchasers and 
attorneys. The petitioner-purchaser relationship is often the first source for 
identifying loss of competitive position in the market. The relationship is also 
important for early documentation of imports as the source of loss in price 
competitiveness. The petitioner-attorney relationship serves as the source for 
cases when attorneys bring the potential for a case to petitioners and when an 
established relationship exists between an experienced petitioner and the 
attorney, where an active system for monitoring import competition has been 
established. The other role of the petitioner-attorney relationship is to aid the 
petitioner(s) in the preparation of their petition for an AD/CVD investigation. 
The preparation of a petition will require the petitioner to divulge proprietary 
and competitively sensitive information to the attorney, who use this to assess 
the initial merit of the case.  To provide such information, Leana and Pil (2006) 
suggest that high levels of trust (resilient trust) must be established between 
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the individuals involved in the relationship.  Respondents will often not 
participate in this phase, even when they are aware of a potential AD/CVD 
case. Where respondents do participate at this early stage, their key 
relationship will be with their attorney. The attorney will educate a respondent 
about the US AD/CVD process and the options available to their client for 
dealing with the prospect of a case.   
Inexperienced petitioners and respondents typically begin the process 
of prosecuting an AD/CVD case without the benefit of the relationship with 
their attorney. One of the first task for respondent counsel is to “start trying to 
reach out to the [foreign] companies, educate them on what the process is, 
what role they will need to play, what the repercussions are if they don’t” 
(interview 44). Inexperienced petitioners typically “end up either being referred 
to an attorney or contacting an attorney to just get educated about the 
process” (interview 31). Preparing to file a petition can take from six months to 
a number of years (interview 35). During this time the attorney will be working 
with petitioners to establish the strength of their case and establish that they 
can produce the data to meet ITC regulations. Attorneys will work with their 
clients to complete many of the activities that will be asked of them by the ITC, 
in a shortened form. Even experienced industry actively monitoring the 
marketplace and in collecting information in preparation for filing a case 
(interview 34) are likely to take around six months to prepare a petition 
(interview 35).  
The actual preparation of trade cases is an intense period of date 
collection and preparation, characterised by frequent communication between 
attorneys and petitioners. Over time, petitioners’ relationships with their 
attorneys change as US producers become more experienced users of the 
trade remedy laws.  Indeed, as the frequency of communication increases, 
petitioners and attorneys build a close set of shared language, codes and 
norms.  As Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) suggest, this is likely to increase levels of 
trust between petitioners and attorneys, which facilitates more cooperative 
activity (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Tyler and Kramer, 1996).  Where 
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attorneys only represent petitioning firms they often do so for ideological 
reasons and reputational effects, which adds to the parties’ emotional 
closeness.  
Typically, the attorney-petitioner structure that develops is one of 
strong ties.  However in inexperienced firms, which usually do not have any 
form of permanent in-house staff or counsel for dealing with these issues, the 
ties will initially be weaker.  Whilst information will still be shared efficiently 
(Burt, 1992), the more fragile trust between the inexperienced petitioner and 
attorney potentially impedes efficient information sharing.  Alternately, with 
experienced petitioners who have brought a number of cases, attorneys are 
likely to have “long standing relationships with these industries, and I think 
they are probably at their side for long periods of time” (interview 47). 
Petitioners are also at an advantage in that it is common for one attorney to 
represent all the petitioning firms, making coordination simpler and reducing 
the cost burden for petitioners (interview 40).  
Furthermore, the attorney-petitioner relationship is likely to develop 
trusting relations and shared language, codes and narratives earlier than the 
attorney-respondent relationship. Where respondents do become aware of a 
potential case, it can be difficult for attorneys to motivate their clients the first 
time they are subject to an investigation (interview 22). Even though early 
action on the part of respondents is argued to influence the outcome of a case 
in AD investigations (interview 13). A recent financial quarter may serve to 
strengthen the petitioners’ case, so “the timing of when you file your petition 
can be really important because you look at the prior year [for the original 
investigation], prior quarters, let’s say you need to get it in by a certain date in 
order to capture that prior quarter” (interview 47). Where a foreign producer is 
able to react to rumours about a potential case early enough, it is possible for 
a trade attorney to work with the company to adjust their sales activity 
(interview 21).  This process, of course, requires that the foreign producer has 
an existing relationship with an attorney. 
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Investigation Phase 
The main actors during this phase are the petitioners, respondents, the 
attorneys, economic consultants, the DOC, the ITC, and US importers and 
purchasers. During this phase petitioners are seeking to show that their 
industry has been materially injured or is threatened by material injury from 
imports.  The key relationships for petitioners are with their attorney, economic 
consultants and the ITC. At this stage, petitioning firms must release business 
sensitive information to their counsel, and the attorney must in turn guide the 
firm through the complex legal process.  Petitioners engage with the DOC 
through the petitioner-attorney relationship to monitor the DOC investigation of 
respondents. The petitioner-ITC relationship has both direct and indirect 
aspects. Petitioners engage the ITC indirectly during verification and the ITC 
public hearing as part of the preliminary and final ITC injury investigation. 
Petitioners engage the ITC indirectly through their attorneys to comment on a 
variety of aspects of the investigation and when completing ITC 
questionnaires. The petitioner-economist serves to enable the economic 
consultants to make the injury case at the ITC.  
Respondents firms naturally prefer to avoid an investigation or limit the 
adverse effect if one arises. Prosecuting the case for respondents means 
rebutting claims of dumping or receiving subsidies. The key relationships for 
the respondents are with their attorneys, economic consultants, the DOC and 
ITC. The respondent-attorney relationship provides petitioners with access to 
the full factual record for a case, including business proprietary information, 
and experience of the norms and procedures at the DOC and ITC. The 
relationship also provides access to advice on legal methods of 
circumvention. The respondent-economist relationship serves to enable the 
economic consultants to respond to the petitioner injury case at the ITC. The 
structural, relational and cognitive aspects of the respondent-economist 
relationships is the same as the respondent-attorney one; in other words, 
experienced firms have stronger ties, more resilient trust and more strongly 
shared language, codes and narratives with attorneys.  At this stage, the 
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respondents have indirect relationships with both the DOC and ITC through 
their attorneys and direct relationships with the DOC during verification and 
the ITC during the ITC public hearing. This relationship can be characterised 
as having weak ties, fragile and generalised trust and reasonably well shared 
language, codes and narratives.  US importers and purchasers have an 
indirect relationship with the ITC when completing importer questionnaires. 
Once a petition is filed the attorney-respondent relationship will need to 
be established very quickly for inexperienced respondents. The ability of 
respondents to get started early is critical (interview 33). As with petitioners 
the attorneys need to educate inexperienced respondents about the process, 
however they face the constraint of doing so within the time allowed by 
statutory deadlines. To prosecute an AD/CVD case requires respondents to 
give very high levels of access to their company information to their attorneys 
and the DOC and ITC, it is therefore very important that respondents trust 
their attorneys (interview 14). The DOC requests a great deal of information 
on respondent’s sales, expenses and cost of production information, in a way 
firms are not necessarily familiar with (interview 48). Attorneys help 
respondents develop the shared language, codes and narratives for 
understanding the DOC requests. The information requested by the DOC 
needs to be provided by the firm, but the attorney ensures that it is complete 
and presented in the manner required by the DOC (interview 38). The quality 
and consistency of access for attorneys is key to how well a respondent is 
able to prosecute a case (interview 24). Attorneys need to learn about the firm 
and industry that they will be representing and they will draw on a number of 
members of staff for this purpose. These relationships are not always smooth 
and can be described as weak ties. Often there may be support for the 
petition among senior mangers, but not lower down the levels, where the staff 
that will have to do the work are just not setup for the demands of the process 
(interview 30). The staff in responding firms who do the day to day work on a 
case typically do so in addition to their normal workload and they may not 
always understand how important the case is to the company (cite). A lack of 
commitment on the part of respondent staff can lead to deadlines for 
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submission of information being missed (interview 48). A recurrent theme in 
how attorneys deal with this issue is to identify a more senior manager within 
the responding firm that can ensure that the work is done. “So they 
[respondents] need to delegate their resources to defending themselves in 
this case, and unless you have somebody in the company fairly high up to 
keep their eyes on that goal, it is very easy for tasks to sort of slide through 
the cracks” (interview 48). Typically the senior managers are associated with 
an appreciation of the importance of the trade case (interview 48). The aim for 
attorneys is to identify the information and systems the respondent already 
has and determine how this can be used to provide the DOC with the 
information they request (interview 9). Petitioning firms are precluded from 
actively prosecuting the case during the DOC investigations, as the 
information concerned is highly confidential and only available to attorneys 
and other individuals granted access under information protective order (IPO). 
The petitioning firms do however provide a supporting role by helping 
attorneys understand the importance of information within the context of the 
industry. 
US producers are relatively successful at prosecuting the ITC 
preliminary injury determination, with only around 10% of petitions ending at 
this stage (interview 24). The injury standard is argued to be so low that a 
petition shouldn’t fail at this early stage. An import aspect of the ITC phase is 
that the ITC is seeking to determine whether injury has been caused to the 
domestic industry as a whole. The ITC uses the questionnaires, verification of 
petitioner submissions and a public hearing to collect the information it needs 
to develop the official record for making an injury determination (interview 30). 
When the verification of the questionnaire responses by US producers takes 
place, the ITC can spend several days going through a company’s books and 
revisions are always required (interview 30). At the ITC hearings it is common 
to have company representatives.  However, typically these are not senior 
managers.  There is a preference for managers working at the operational 
level. The ITC Commissioners ask probing questions and CEOs can be to 
high up to be effective, so it is common to have a sales manager at the 
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hearing. The ITC hearing is an opportunity for a company to speak directly to 
the final decision maker and could be an opportunity to turn a vote. But the 
hearings are most useful for informing the contents of the post hearing briefs 
(interview 11). If the ITC makes a final affirmative determination, then the 
DOC issues a duty order and the subject goods of the foreign producers, 
which export to the US, become subject to the duty rate determined to apply 
to them. If the ITC makes a negative injury determination the case ends and 
not duties are applied. 
Review Phase 
The main actors during this phase are the petitioners, respondents, the 
attorneys, economic consultants, the DOC and the ITC. The DOC administers 
a number of reviews on an annual basis after an AD or CVD duty has been 
put in place. The DOC and ITC conducts sunset reviews of cases no later 
than five years after a duty order is issued by the DOC (USITC, 1996). The 
sunset review attempts to determine whether the revocation of an order would 
lead to injury occurring again or not. The main review that responding and 
petitioning firms are concerned with is the administrative review which needs 
to be conducted by the DOC on request as often as every 12 months (USITC, 
1996). The petitioner-attorney relationship during the review phase is key to 
monitoring for possible circumvention and whether respondent pricing 
decisions during the previous year has been consistent with attempting to 
eliminate dumping or not. The respondent-attorney relationship should aim to 
support respondents in developing systems to manage pricing decisions to 
eliminate dumping in AD cases. 
The US AD system has retrospective assessment of duties. 
Respondents will make cash deposits at the duty rate calculated in the original 
investigation. If after one year a respondent believes that they have adjusted 
their pricing to eliminate dumping activity, then they can request an 
administrative review to assess their actual duty margin. If the firm is no 
longer found to be dumping, then their cash deposits and interest will be 
returned. Alternatively, if respondents believe that a respondent’s selling 
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practices should attract a higher duty margin than the firm was assigned in the 
original investigation, then the petitioner can request an administrative review 
in the hope that the respondents deposit margin will be revised upward. 
Respondents need to get a process in place to deal with administrative 
reviews. Attorneys “help the company to sort of put systems in place that will 
make it easier to respond to a review questionnaires at the administrative 
review process. So I think, unless there is a lot of turnover in a company and 
you have the same people, then you are more likely to do better the next time 
around” (interview 48). But it can be difficult for attorneys to convince 
respondents of this, additionally the experience of participating in the 
investigation phase is important for prosecuting the review phase (interview 
16). A problem which respondent firms face is that there can be high staff 
turnover with respect to dealing with these cases (interview 48) and this leads 
to attorneys having to retrain staff to prosecute the review phase of a case. 
For petitioners the review phase of a case is far less intensive than 
prosecuting the original investigation (interview 11). Petitioners will monitor 
the activity of the respondent firms and request administrative reviews when 
they believe they can get the duty margin increased for example. They may 
also have to retain counsel to prosecute new shipper reviews and scope 
enquires, but the substantial burden during this phase falls on responding 
firms. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper has sought to develop a more nuanced understanding of the 
corporate political activity through the application of social capital theory.  The 
structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of SC were used to illuminate 
important, qualitative aspects of corporate political activity.  Interview 
materials suggest that relational aspects of social capital are most important.  
The ITC and DOC investigative processes are complex, can be lengthy and 
make considerable informational requirements on firms.  As such, firms with 
well established, resilient trust may be better able to negotiate the process 
and gain a favourable outcome.   
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The paper is less clear about whether closed relationships are integral 
to success in the process, though it seems likely.  Equally, the extent of 
shared cognitive space is equivocal.  Both will require more in-depth research 
to establish.  However, the key role of attorney’s and other consultants, such 
as economists, is highlighted.  Their reputation and skill are clearly key in the 
prosecution of trade cases and it is therefore likely that the most skilled 
among them will be in high demand.  The corporate political activity literature 
has overlooked the important role of brokers of this sort, preferring instead to 
concentrate on firms themselves.  This paper argues for more attention to be 
paid to the intermediaries in the process. 
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Figure 1: Revised Model of Process for Prosecuting an Unfair Trade Cases in United 
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Figure 2 – Dimensions of Social Capital 
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